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HIRAM JOHNSON: HIS PART IN ISOLATIONISM IN THE 1930'S
CHAPTER I
JOHNSON AND THE ISOLATIONIST PATTERN
One of the major dramas in Congress in the 1930's was isolationism. The plot 
reveals a complexity of factors and has not as yet been wholly untangled. There 
does, however, emerge one personality who seems to have been extremely consistent 
in his role. This was Hiram Johnson, Republican senator from California.
Undoubtedly the emotional speeches made by Senator Johnson did much to deepen 
the cleavage on foreign policy between Congress and Franklin D. Roosevelt in that 
decade. His Congressional clamorings paralleled the work of Father Coughlin and 
of William Randolph Hearst in leading the public away from reality. His diatribes 
were a message to aggressing dictators that the temper of the American nation was 
such that it would condemn, but not prevent, their moves in Europe and the Far 
East.
Johnson had spent his political apprenticeship in the progressive movement.
In the 1930 's he was a remnant of that group which had begun its national crusade 
with the fiery oratory of William Jennings Bryan. Like Bryan and other progres­
sives of the early twentieth century, Johnson was a fighter for what he saw as the 
righteous cause. Photographs and cartoons of Johnson with clenched fists raised 
in boxing position were typical of his political career. His isolationism was a 
crusade against the League of Nations and its Permanent Court of International 
Justice "where the controlling individuals represent dictatorships, absolutism, 
tyranny"j^a crusade against the President (whether Wilson, Hoover or Franklin
Roosevelt) whom he saw as stealing "that which is peculiarly within the jurisdic-
2tion of the Congress..."} a crusade against those foreign nations which he termed
1 Congressional Record, 7l|th Cong., 1st Session, p. 1|80, Jan. 16, 1935*
2 Congressional Record, 71st Cong., Special Session, p. 27, July 8, 1930.
2
3"spongers." This was Johnson*s personal brand of isolationism.
It cannot be explained away according to geographic theories; the Pacific 
iCoast as a section supported the administration's foreign policy both through its 
members in the Senate and the House. In Congress as a whole California was one of 
the least isolationist states. Samuel Lubell's idea that isolationism was largely 
jthe result of ethnic allegiance does not fit Johnson either. The state which con­
sistently sent him to Washington, D.C. had a large upper middle class of old Amer­
ican stock. Strong isolationist sentiment has also been attributed to regions of 
cultural insularity, but California's population was concentrated in four metro­
politan districts. Likewise, party explanations do not suffice in determining the 
basis of Johnson's isolationism. The GOP was isolationist, but Johnson was more 
so. He was one of the irreconcilables on the League issue in 1919J his opposition 
on foreign measures persisted under Republican Presidents Harding and Coolidge; he 
led the fight against the London Naval Treaty negotiated under the Hoover admini­
stration.^
It is unlikely that Johnson's isolationism in the 1930's was an evidence of 
opposition to the Democratic administration. It is also unlikely to have been a 
result of opposition to the New Deal; Johnson was an old-time progressive and had 
supported Roosevelt for the presidency in 1932. His isolationism was rather a 
manifestation of Hiram Johnson's personality.
3 Congressional Record, 7Uth Cong., 1st Session, p. U8U, Jan. 16, 1935*
1* George L. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy, The 
John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science Series, LXVIII, 
Number 3 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1951) p. 105; Ralph H. Srauckler,
"The Region of Isolationism," American Political Science Review, XLVII (June, 1953) 
p. 392; Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: Harper, 1952)
pp. 132, ll|.6; George E. Howry, The California Progressives (Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press, 195l) p. 90.
CHAPTER II
THE BASIS FOR JOHNSON'S FIGHT
Since Hiram Johnson was a "righteous" man, he placed his principles above 
reproach. Once convinced of the rectitude of his position, he held to it "often 
irrespective of later evidence." His concern was "to serve the public interest, 
and he was unquestionably incorruptible and courageous." "^But these virtues 
proved to be his faults. To serve the public interest was, for Johnson, to decide 
the public interest; to be incorruptible was to be inflexible; to be courageous 
was to be stubborn.
His political record as well as his speeches in the Senate indicate M s  in­
tense pride. In 1920, after failing to get the Republican nomination for the 
presidency, he refused to be placed in the second spot on the ticket. Thus, Gal­
vin Coolidge rather than Hiram Johnson stepped into the White House upon Harding's 
death in 1923.
Johnson was much concerned with dignity. The Senate must keep aloof from
2Europe, jealously guarding its privileges. "Are we to maintain our dignity...?" 
he asked M s  fellow senators when demanding documents from the State Department 
in the debate over ratification of the London Treaty. The nation must keep aloof 
from Europe, suspiciously guarding its republican heritage. To preserve national 
dignity seemed to be the basis of M s  argument for the Johnson Act in 193U to pro- 
M bit loans to nations in default of World War I debts. This one can infer from 
a story he related in the Senate, explaiMng the background of the measure. It 
concerned a "gentleman" who in Europe had "met on every side with hostility."
1 Mowry, pp. 111]., 116.
2 Congressional Record, 71st Gong., Special Session, p. 62, July 10, 1930.
He met -with sneers and jibes at our country and the debts which 
are due from foreign countries to ours. In something of exasperation 
one day he wrote me that there ought to be some mode in which we 
would express our will or our displeasure, some mode by which we 
would preclude the possibility in the future of that occurring which 
had occurred in the past. His letter.. .impressed me immensely, and 
I endeavored then, long ago, to present a measure to the Senate 
which would prevent individuals in this country selling the securi-  ^
ties of those countries which had defaulted on the debts they owed us.
This was the basis of the Johnson Act, and it goes far to show the make-up 
of the man who introduced it. Much of what ma.de Hiram Johnson was, or seemed to 
be, embodied in the California progressive creed— an emphasis on religion, a con­
cern with problems of morality, and "talk shot through with-biblical allusion."
The progressive belief was that "evil perished and good would triumph, " democracy 
was "a thing to venerate," public opinion was the "final distillate of moral law,11 
and "individualism was a sacred thing as long as it was moral individualisti."^
One sees evidence of all this in Johnson. In his 1935 attack on United 
States 1 entry into the World Court, he quoted Virgil— "Easy is the descent to 
hell"— as a parallel. "Hell" was the League, and the World Court was the "first 
step" on the descent. Such was Johnson's opinion on international organization. 
His ‘heaven* would undoubtedly have been an individual one with each nation in its 
own separate sphere. Historical parallels and allusions were even more predomi­
nant in liis speeches. Washington's warning against entangling alliances may as 
well have been uttered to became a device in the hands of the future Hiram John­
son.
The triumph of good was to be insured by Johnson's pointing out the bad. His 
"veneration" for democracy was profuse, but it extended only to that w M c h  was
3 Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Session, p. 8191? May 7 193i|.
ii Kowry, pp. 97-99.
5 Congressional Record, 7Uth Cong., 1st Session, p. ij.82, Jan. 16, 1935.
5within the confines of the United States. In advocating "Americanism,” which was
Johnson’s term for what others called isolationism, he spoke "not as a citizen of
6the world," but "...as a citizen of the United States." This was a reflection of
7pis provincial attitude. His identification did not extend past that which he knew 
and understood, and Hiram Johnson did not understand the world. He was "a Califor­
nian, loving the soil and loving the state" and would "not intrust that state...to 
those with their internationalist views who do not believe that any protection
O
should be accorded any place on the face of the earth." Here was Johnson’s cause—  
to protect the ’good’ people, whom he understood, from those ’bad’ men with inter­
nationalist views, those "pseudointellectuals who are so perfectly certain they are 
right."9
By the 1930 's Johnson was getting used to playing the role of the great cru­
sader. He had entered the political scene in the first decade of the century in 
such a guise. His group then was the Lincoln-Roosevelt Republican League in Cali­
fornia. Johnson was its vice-president. The organization identified itself with 
the national progressive movement and set out to "free the state from corporate 
rule"— namely, the Southern Pacific railroad which had been in control of the Cali­
fornia GOP machinery for nearly forty years. In the 1910 state primaries, Johnson 
Swaged a "campaign for righteousness" on the single issue of the Southern Pacific 
machine with the result that the Lincoln-Roosevelt League took over the party ma­
chinery and shortly thereafter, the state. Johnson’s first moral cause had won, 
and he soon set out to show his crusading spirit on the national scene
6 Ibid., p. ij.79, Jan. 16, 1935.
7 Mowry, p. 286.
8 Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Session, p. 9963* May 30, 193U.
9 Congressional Record, ?Uth Cong., 1st Session, p. U88, Jan. 16, 1935.
10 Mowry, pp. 8, 81+, 120 ;George Payne, The Birth of the New Party (New York:
H.E. Rennels, 1912) p. 8iu
He was among the charter members of the National Progressive Republican
League, and in 1912 led the Theodore Roosevelt forces in the Republican National
Convention. The convention split over the issue of 238 seats claimed by both
Taft and Roosevelt delegations. Losing to the Taft delegates, Johnson and other
Roosevelt men formed a new Progressive Party. Johnson gave the opening speech of
11the rebel group, became chairman of its national organizing committee, and was ul­
timately selected as Teddy Roosevelt's running mate. Keeping in character, John­
son "pledged himself for the rest of his life to the cause that had called him to 
12
leadership" and declared that he "world rather go down to defeat with Teddy Roose-
13velt in this cause than go to victory in another with any other man." This party 
to which he declared allegiance was against the political power of big business 
and, in that respect, was attacking the basic policy of the Old Guard Republicans. 
The result of this was that the Democratic rather than the Progressive or the Re­
publican parties won in 1912.
There are indications that Johnson was not easily forgiven by the GOP. In
1923 the Los Angeles Times was still denouncing him as a "selfish politician who
ll;helped to wreck the Republican party in 1912." His motives were attributed to per­
sonal factors, for his national aspirations were evident "in almost every move the 
California Progressive party made after 19114.." In’that year Johnson carried all 
but four counties to become the first California governor to be reelected since 
1833, while leading candidates of the Progressive party were defeated in other
13
states. It was evident that Progressive strength was diminishing, however, and in
11 Mowry, pp. 160, 183-187} Payne, p. 138.
12 Payne, p. 63.
13 Ibid., p. 68.
ll; "Hiram Johnson’s Chances," Literary Digest, LXXIX (Dec. 1, 1923) p. 18. 
13 Mowry, pp. 218, 223.
71916 Johnson ran for the Senate on the Republican ticket. He won, but at the same
time, Charles Evans Hughes lost the Presidency because of the California vote.
Although there is no proof for the charge, the Los Angeles Times rebuked Johnson
and his Progressives for '‘selling out the Republican party in California and in 
16the nation." The feeling was that Johnson did not give the support he should have 
to Hughes.
In the Senate Johnson continued in his oppositionist role. His first exper­
ience in that body was the special session in which the United States decided to 
join the Allies in World War I. Assuming the negative position he subsequently
did on most international issues, Johnson joined the isolationists. His cause was
17no longer reform, but "Americanism." This not only took the form of opposition to 
U.S. entry into the war, but placed Johnson with the irreconcilables in refusing 
further international commitments afterwards. Johnson's belief in individualism 
was never better manifested than in his 1919 actions. He and some fourteen others, 
the "Battalion of Death," stubbornly opposed Woodrow Wilson's plans for a League 
of Nations. Vindictive attacks by Johnson and William Borah of Idaho convinced 
the people that there were dangers in internationalism, and they succeeded in de­
feating the Versailles Treaty in the Senate.
Johnson's critical attitude did not change when his own party assumed the na­
tional ascendancy in 1921. His opposition to the Four Power Pact, one of the trea­
ties emerging from the Washington Conference of 1921-22, was in spite of support 
for the measure by California Republicans and by President Harding, and also in 
spite of the fact that the good will of the administration was necessary in that
16 Ibid., p. 273.
17 Ibid., p. 285
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grear as he sought high tariff rates for California products. In this debate, he
came forth as "the most unqualified isolationist in the country," bluntly charging i
19that his own party had reversed its position on internationalism.
Taking this position, as one writer has said, he later "defied the moderates
in his party and refused to accept any American responsibility for facilitating
20the collection of war reparations or promoting German recovery." As Johnson saw 
it, the Reparations Commission was another means by which the United States was to j 
be drawn into the affairs of Europe against its will. He was not willing that the 
Ination become a partner in the method by which reparations would be eollectedj yet 
he was vociferous in demands for the money. When the depression led to repudia­
tion of the war debts, he denounced former allies and determined to bring about 
the act prohibiting further loans to these nations.
Many of Johnson's actions at this time have been attributed to his presiden­
tial aspirations. Intense isolationism was an issue by which he could ally him­
self with both the regular Republicans and the progressives, for this was a doc­
trine common to both elements in his party. His "Americanism" was to serve as com­
pensation for his 1912 estrangement from the party. The emotion-packed speeches
21he delivered on the subject kept him in the public eye.
Johnson's failure to get the presidential nomination in 1920 was certainly a 
disappointment to him— so much so that, as previously stated, he could not bring 
himself to accept the second place on the ticket. By 1923 he had already announcec 
his next attempt to secure the nomination. His platform was an attack on the ad-
18 George P. West, "Hiram Johnson after Twelve Years," The Nation, CXV 
(Aug. 9, 1922) p. li*2.
19 Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse (New York: Abelard-Schuraan, 1957)
p. 152.
20 Ibid., p. 173.
21 Ibid., p. 173-17U.
9ministration of Calvin Coolidge, the man most likely to prevent Johnson’s getting
the nomination. It contained his usual group of vague generalities, designed to
criticize the administration’s tax and foreign policies. He said he would go to
22ary length and make any sacrifice to preclude wars, but he got little favorable 
response. In this period of peaceful prosperity, isolationist sentiment was los­
ing its former militancy among the public. Mot having any other significant moral 
issue, Johnson was unsuccessful in Iris 192k efforts.
Approaching the 1928 convention, Johnson again began his attack on a poten­
tial contender, Herbert Hoover. There had previously been animosity between the 
two Californians, and although Johnson agreed to back Hoover after the latter’s 
1928 nomination, this persisted throughout the ensuing administration.
In spite of the fact that Johnson never seemed quite popular enough with the 
national GOP to secure top spot on the ballot, his large majorities in California 
elections gave him an independence in his Senate role and go far to explain his 
rebuffs to party discipline. Borah was in a similar position. Following his 
stand on the League in 1919? Johnson multiplied his 1910 majority of kk,000 in the
California primary by more than three. In the 1922 senatorial race, he was elect-
23
ed by a plurality of 3^8,6?U, the largest in his political career up to that time. 
A major reason for his strength in his own state was undoubtedly his success in 
getting high tariff rates on California products^ The constant support of Califor­
nia for Hiram Johnson persisted throughout his political life, which continued un­
til his death in 19k!?> In 19it0 when Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Californians not
22 "Hiram Johnson's Platform," Outlook, CXXXVI (Jan. 16, 19210 p. 83.
23 "Borah and Johnson, Disturbers of the Senatorial Peace,” Literary Digest, 
LXII (Aug. 23, 1919) p. 32; "Hiram Johnson— Problem," The New Republic, XXII 
(May 19, 1920) p. 369; "A Letter from Johnson," Literary Digest, LXXVTII (Sept.8, 
1923) p. 11.
2k West, "Hiram Johnson after Twelve Years," p. lU3.
10
to reelect Johnson, because he had been thwarting administration foreign policy,
the Senator received the largest vote in all his thirty years of victory. "On
primary day California Democrats decided that Johnson was a Democrat and Republi-
25cans decided he was a Republican,"and the great majority of votes were cast for 
him.
Thus, one can assume that Johnson was somewhat justified in assuming he was 
advocating what was best for the people; looking at election returns, he could 
honestly conclude that the people believed that what he said and did was good for 
them. Democracy in California was sanctioning his actions in the Senate, and for 
much the same reasons, democracy in the nation was slow to respond to the interna­
tional upheaval of the 1930's.




JOHNSON IN THE HOOVER ADMINISTRATION
To what extent Johnson's views were a reflection of those commonly held by 
the man-on-the-street at that time and to what extent the reverse was true can on­
ly be speculation. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that men like Johnson 
in the Senate, Hearst through the press, and Father Coughlin via the radio played 
a considerable part in influencing the attitude of the times— that is, an attitude 
which held a nation capable of assuming world leadership to an old policy which 
had already proved unsuccessful in preventing involvement in mass warfare.
America had turned its back on Europe in the 1920's. While Harding and Cool- 
idge had each presented the World Court protocols to the Senate, there had been no 
real effort to push them through the legislative channels. While the Dawes and 
Young plans had emerged in answer to the reparations problem, it was merely for the 
expediency of getting back an American investment. While the Washington Conference 
was hailed as a huge success, it was largely because we had managed to terminate 
the bothersome Anglo-Japanese alliance with virtually no obligation. The U.S. had 
not, in any case, stuck its neck out. The Pact of Paris, a noble declaration by 
which this countiy avoided a bilateral agreement with France, was a result of the 
very fact that we wanted a weak agreement or none at all.
Then, in 1929 a professed internationalist arrived at the White House. This 
was Herbert Hoover, destined to endure the most vindictive attacks Johnson ever 
aimed at a Republican president. Hoover was not only an internationalistj he was 
pro-British. What is more, he and Johnson had been old foes in their home state 
of California, and his name on the 1928 ballot had been in the place where Hiram 
Johnson had wished his own to be. These factors set the two men in diametrically 
opposed comers of the ring in which policy issues were decided. There was no se­
crecy about the enmity existing between them, and in the Hoover administration,
U m E « * T Y  O F  iiunm
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Johnson became more than ever disengaged from the party leadership.
By this time a well entrenched member of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit­
tee, Johnson was in a favorable position to pursue his isolationist role. The de­
pression, when it came in the late months of 1929, gave him additional arguments 
for his point of view— why look abroad when there were problems enough at home?
He was willing that the U.S. play its part in the world, but "do it in our own way 
...pursuing our own unhampered course."^
His first pursuit along this line in the 1930's concerned the London naval 
treaty, a document drawn up on the assumption that more limitation of armaments 
was necessary. Hoover had previously agreed on this point with Ramsay MacDonald, 
new British prime minister who had then issued invitations to the conference. When 
the Senate was called upon to ratify the resulting product, Johnson indicated that 
he did not share the philosophy of these men. He attacked the treaty's substitu­
tion of a 10-10-7 ratio in destroyer tonnage, following the 5-5-3 in capital ships 
formerly existing between Great Britain, the U.S. and Japan. He made similar argu­
ments against Japan's being given parity with the two larger powers in submarines, 
extension of the naval 'holiday' to 1936, and the 'escalator' clause giving the 
three nations the right to exceed treaty quotas if a security threat was caused by 
naval construction of a nation not a party to the agreement.
Johnson had raised his fists and prepared to lead another fight. He stepped 
into the battle holding high his presentation of the minority views of the Foreign 
Relations Committee:
It is a noticeable and remarkable fact that a treaty for which so 
much is claimed, opposition to which arouses such a pretense of indig­
nation, is presented to the Senate without explanation or report. 2
1 Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 3rd Session, p. 1371* Jan. 5, 1931.
2 Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Session, p. 12021, June 30, 1930.
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Here was the old contention that the President had not rendered the Senate 
its due. Hoover had been careful to avoid 'Wilson's mistake by sending Democratic 
Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas and Republican Senator David A. Reed of 
Pennsylvania in the delegation to the London Conference, but he had still, accord­
ing to Johnson, injured Senate dignity by not presenting the committee with the 
dispatches between Secretary of State Stimson and Charles G. Dawes, the American 
ambassador in London during the period of negotiations. In addition, Johnson be­
rated the executive for demanding that all minutes, records, and documents pertain­
ing to the conference and presented to the Foreign Relations Committee be kept
3
strictly confidential. Johnson maintained that these belonged in the public recordl 
His primary concern regarding the treaty seemed to be, not its possible effects, 
but the motives of those who negotiated the agreement.
Motives were all-important for Johnson. He was so sincere, apparently, that 
one can sympathize with his lack of foresight. From all appearances, he believed 
in his unreasonable demands upon the President and State Department. He called 
upon the Senators for support:
...if there is the spirit of those old patriots who made this body 
what it was, and wrote this country's history in the glory of the 
skies for all the world to see— if there are yet men of that caliber 
and of kind in this body, neither supinely nor lying down will they 
take the lashing that has been accorded them in telling them of their 
impudence in asking for documents which they have a right to see... k
Hoover and Stimson believed that the release of such documents and papers would in­
dicate lack of confidence in our diplomats, and this could conceivably interfere 
with future American negotiations.
Another point of Johnson's attack on the treaty was that it served the inter­
ests of Great Britain. To him, anything that helped the British was contrary to
3 Ibid., p. 12028, June 30, 1930.
U Congressional Record, 71st Cong., Special Session, p. 110, July 11, 1930.
11*
U.S. interests. His line of reasoning indicated suspicions that Great Britain had
conspired to prevent the U.S. from acquiring naval strength since our sea-going
commerce challenged that of her empire. He professed his "favor” of limitation
and reduction of armaments. It was something to "hope and strive" for, but in the
meantime, the U.S. must have "in fair comparison with others the ability to main-
d
tain and protect our trade routes and our ocean commerce." In this time of great 
depression, the nation must, as Johnson saw it, dispose of its surplus abroad in 
order to avoid privation. There was a distorted sense of internationalism in the 
Senator*s economic theory, but he did not perceive the contradiction between this 
and his isolationist theory. The U.S. must not involve itself in the troubles of 
Europe, but it was mighty fine that Europe was there to help out with a few econo­
mic troubles of the U.S. This "desideratum," however, could be accomplished only 
with sea power
Johnson was eager to point out that the U.S. "commercial success" was not 
likely to lead to war, because
...America’s intentions are so pacific, our policies are so utter­
ly lacking in aggression, that it seems inconceivable the pursuit of 
legitimate commercial paths, even to the exclusion of trade rivals, 
could ever give such offense as would lead to armed conflict. 7
Economic policy as a cause of war just did not apply to a moral nation like the
U.S.
Johnson came through as a true disciple of Teddy Roosevelt in the debate, 
pointing out that the size of a nation’s fleet must be based upon its policies.
Sea power was essential to the open door policy in Chinaj it was necessary for a
5 Ibid., p. 115, July 11, 1930.
6 Ibid., p. 2b, July 17, 1930.
7 Ibid., p. 225, July 17, 1930.
15
•neutral' policy. The reasons for his argument on this point are obvious. John­
son, being a Californian, had his eyes on the Pacific. Our Far Eastern policy was 
that in which he was most interested. Our trade with the Orient was that which he 
was most desirous of protecting. The U.S. must be 'neutral' so far as Europe was 
concerned, but there was no implication of neutrality in regard to the Open Door. 
Johnson admitted dreams of the Pacific "as the great theatre of world activity in 
the years to come," and because of this "vision," he was making a "contest" over 
the London treaty.
The treaty, however, was not threatening the U.S. navy. The fact was that we 
would have to spend about a billion dollars to build up to the parity it granted. 
Johnson seemed to be aware of this, but called attention to the point only when it 
suited his argument. Thus, one moment he was able to charge that the reduction of 
armaments by the treaty was "a sham, a delusion, a snare," and in the same speech 
to draw a comparison between the London Conference and the Washington Conference 
with the contention that by the 1922 treaties we "put beyond our power the defense 
of the Philippine Islands." In his opinion, the worst thing about the London trea­
ty was that it had raised the ratio of Japan that we "dearly bought" in 1922 by re­
fusing to fortify our possessions in the Far East. Johnson did not point out, how­
ever, that in 1922 the Nine Power Pact was not viewed as any sacrifice on our part
g
since Congress had no plan to strengthen Guam and the Philippines anyway.
Similarly, at the 1930 conference the U.S. had suffered no loss in actual na­
val strength. The 'limits' were, at most, curbs on shipbuilding potential if Con­
gress were ever to grant adequate appropriations, and the legislature had long 
scoffed at proposals for a stronger navy. Johnson, however, seemed to be attack­
ing the treaty on the assumption that without it, the U.S. would build up the most
8 Ibid., pp. 222-223 and 228-229, July 17, 1930
16
powerful navy on the seas. He saw the "real issue" in the controversy as
...the question of whether we shall leave in foreign hands the power 
to work their will upon us through immense economic pressure exerted 
by the instrumentality of a naval blockade. 9
His contention was that, considering numbers of people and extent of business 
involved, U.S. trading interests were superior to those of any other nation, and 
because of this, our navy had to be stronger than any other. The real danger, he 
indicated, stemmed from the power of Britain, for only she could affect a blockade. 
It was "not so much a question of naval competition" as of "business competition 
supported by diplomatic competition." Here again one sees traces of the old pro- 
gressivism in Johnson— a mistrust of business interests and England, which was seer, 
as the center of the money trust. He termed it a "fact" that the British "not on­
ly destroyed our supremacy, but reduced us to an actual inferiority." His words 
create a picture of the powerful, conniving Great Britain taking advantage of the 
less powerful, but innocent U.S. much in the same way Johnson had seen the evil, 
corporate interests as talcing advantage of the just people. He exhibited his in­
ability to avoid moral judgment when he asked if there were "no ethics in these 
conferences," implying that ethics would have led the British and Japanese to re­
cognize the superiority of our trading interest.^
In opposing his party in its support of the treaty, he charged its members 
with seeking to make political capital out of the document. He openly scoffed at 
party discipline and lauded his own individuality in opposing the "fifty or sixty 
men whipped into line and lashed into inactivity, sitting mute and silent and fear­
ful of uttering a single word." He took pride in the fact that even as an "old
11man" he was "fighting his own fight."
9 Ibid.., p. 2^3, July 18, 1930.
10 Ibid., pp. 259, 302-303, 306, July 18, 1930.
11 Ibid., p. 296, July 18, 1930.
17
Here was the crusader at work, and as always, he had carried the issue to the 
people. As he had traveled up and down the California coast in 1910 to tell the 
people how the state must be freed from the evils of corporate rule, and as he had 
with Borah trailed Wilson in 1919 to warn against entry into the League, he now 
attempted to reach the people via the printed speech. Lack of adequate funds pre­
vented him from sending more than a few thousand copies, and he was quick to point 
to the contest as "unequal," because the U.S. Government Treasury stood behind the
State Department, which was able to issue copies of a speech made by a proponent 
12of the League. But it was a "glorious thing," he said, in an unequal contest "to
stand your guard, knowing you are right." His inflexibility was well indicated in
the debate on this issue; Johnson admitted with pride that he had not swerved a
13single iota from the views he held in the beginning.
On the day of voting his cause was not won, for the measure passed 58-9. How­
ever, the influence of Johnson is evident in that ratification was with the ■under­
liestanding that there were no secret agreements made in connection with the treaty. 
The debate perhaps even furthered the cause for isolationism; he had managed to 
point enough fingers at the British to convince any number of people that the new 
and the old worlds had little or no interests in common. He never mentioned our 
stake in the European balance of power; it is likely he never realized it.
When in December, 1930, Hoover presented the World Court issue to the Senate, 
Johnson again made accusations of deception. The American people were indirectly 
and surreptitiously to be taken into the League which, he said, they "overwhelming­
ly repudiated" in 1920. One can question whether or not the voters were given a
12 £i£*> p* 223 > JxJ-y 17 > 1930*
13 P« 376, July 21, 1930. 
11* Ibid., p. 378, July 21, 1930.
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clear cut choice on this issue in 1920, but even if the returns were evidence of 
such repudiation, this would not seem to rule out a reconsideration in 1930. There 
were many Americans who, by this time, had adopted a much friendlier attitude to­
ward the League. For Johnson, however, the conditions existing in 1930 provided 
even stronger reasons for avoiding international organization. To remedy our own 
ills and relieve our own people was the immediate task at hand for the Senate, as 
Johnson viewed the situation. This meant ignoring the "propaganda" of the "highly 
financed" League, which was "bludgeoning the Senate and demanding the immediate ra-
15tification" of the protocols.
Not only was this attack typical of his scorn f or anything European, but it 
was another illustration of his stalling tactics. The implication of his pleas for 
time on foreign measures was that they were being rushed through, because there was 
something devious about them that would be revealed if the vote were delayed long 
enough. It would seem, however, that Johnson's real motive for such tactics was to 
allow public opinion to catch -up on the issue— specifically, his side of the issue. 
In this, Johnson frequently succeeded, for public opinion, at least until the lat­
ter part of the 1930's, was decidedly isolationist. Also, in stalling, Johnson 
gave Hearst and Coughlin, who seemed to be in some sort of alliance with the Sena­
tor, ample opportunity to exploit whatever sentiment did exist. When the protocols 
were again submitted -under Franklin D. Roosevelt, this strategy became particularly 
significant.
Other than disarmament, the major foreign policy to command attention in the 
Hoover administration was the war debt question. Johnson was of the group that op­
posed, not only cancellation, but also the moratorium. As he pointed to the World 
Court as a first step to the League, he charged that a revision of the debts was
15 Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 3rd Session, p. 1370, Jan. 5, 1931
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"the open wedge" to cancellation. The argument was one which had special appeal
with the public, for it struck at the pocketbook; if Europe failed to pay, the A-
merican taxpayer would have to asstime the debts. To him, the European view that
war debts should constitute the U.S. contribution to a common cause meant that "we
17contribute everything and they contribute nothing."
Johnson, of course, was ready to fight for the cause of the taxpayer and told 
his colleagues:
...it is time there should be some kind of warning spoken in this 
chamber and in this Government by those who believe that, after all, 
this Government belongs to just one people, the American people; who 
believe that, after all, burdens that belong to Europe should not be 
put upon the backs of Americans...18
The implication was that Hoover did not share the belief. After assuring sup­
port of an adequate number of Congressmen, the President had taken it upon himself 
in June of 1930 to declare the debt moratorium. When this was formally submitted 
for Congressional approval in December, Johnson seized his chance to charge Hoover 
with seeking "to legislate without the formalities required by the Constitution" 
and dealing with "what means the very lifeblood of the people." He petitioned the 
Senate to unite with him in preventing this "first great violation that has been 
attempted by an Executive." To do otherwise would be taking a "step toward dicta­
torship .
Johnson did not admit, if he realized, that Hoover’s choice had been between 
cancellation and the postponement of payment, and the latter had been the lesser of 
two political evils. Along with the moratorium, the President submitted to Con-
16 Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Session, p. 5>39, Dec. 15>, 1931.
17 Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Session, p. 127U, Jan. It, 1933.
18 Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Session, p. 15082+, July 12, 1932.
19 Ibid., p. 1079, Dec. 22, 1931.
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gress in December a recommendation that the World War Foreign Debt Commission be
recreated, but on this measure, Johnson*s philosophy- won out. The Senator had
been wise to show that the commission was likely to serve, not only as a body to
revise the debts downward, but as a means to take us into Europe.
The question of war debts continued to plague the administration, and Johnson
continued to keep a vigilant eye on Hoover*s actions in regard to the issue. The
Senator was prompt in pointing out the possible meaning of the Lausanne Conference,
when Hoover met French Premier Pierre Laval to discuss war debts. The outcome of
the conference was indefinite. Johnson resented "that the American people should
have been kept in absolute ignorance of any...understanding" on the debts. The
State Department denied that there had been any agreement made at Lausanne, but
Johnson called attention to Chamberlain»s reference in the British Parliament to
20the "gentlemen»s agreement" made with Hoover. When in the London Economic Confer­
ence, British Prime Minister MacDonald felt forced to say that ‘Lausanne has to be
completed,t the Senator's suspicions that the cancellation of German reparations
21was dependent on our forgiving debts seemed to have been justified. Here was more 
fuel for the fire.
Johnson*s policy of keeping a suspicious watch on government was closely re­
lated to his progressivism— the idea that government was run by big business at 
the expense of the people. He saw the stakes in the game of foreign loans as be­
ing appropriated by the supermen of finance. The Senator's claim was that the mo­
ratorium had postponed payment of the Allied debt to the American taxpayer in favor 
of payment of short-term securities to international bankers. Hence, these bankers 
would persuade the Government to grant another moratorium or revise the debts due
20 Ibid., p. 15082, July 12, 1932.
21 D. W. Brogan, Roosevelt and the New Deal (London: Oxford University
Press, 1952) p. 39.
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to the people. The Government, Johnson charged, was neglecting its responsibili-
22ties to its investing public. He championed the case of the farmer of the Midwest 
and the worker without a job, who cried aloud "against a government that would 
give a moratorium to Europe and put Europe1 s debt upon his back." He admonished
Johnson was also not to forget his old concern with national dignity. There 
were many who advocated revision as a means to avoid complete default by the Euro­
pean nations, but the Senator preferred the latter to the former on the grounds 
that in this case, America could at least continue to hold her head high. His rea­
soning on this seemed to contradict his former statements:
We can afford the injustice of defaulting, non-payment, but we 
can not afford to be bludgeoned or bullied or frightened into yield­
ing the right and accepting whatever internationally may be doled out.2**
So it seems that Johnson was even more concerned with the national dignity
than with the national pocketbook. He accused his opponents on the issue with
seeking flattery abroad2llnd those abroad with laughing at us for our thinking of
26"buying disarmament, or buying peace, or buying friendship, by forgiving debts."
The Johnson argument, whatever its weaknesses, was that which triumphed in the 
matter of debts. He had succeeded in making it political suicide for anyone to 
speak for revision or cancellation. Thus, Franklin Roosevelt avoided Hoover's 
plea for a commitment on the question, and the outgoing President was forced to 
become a witness to that which he had feared most-default. When this occurred in
ssional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Session, pp. 6052-3 and 6061-2,
23 Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Session, p. 1273, Jan. 1|., 1933#
2h Ibid#, P# 1278, Jan. it, 1933#
25 Ibid., p. 1279, Jan. it, 1933.
26 Ibid., p. 2itf6, Jan. 25, 1933.
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December, 1932, the average .American grew even more thoroughly disgusted with the 
outside world and tightly embraced the Johnson philosophy of 'let1s-worry-about- 




JOHNSON IN THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION 
Although Johnson in 1928 had subordinated his personal dislike for Hoover and 
remained loyal to the GOP, his alliance with that group in the administration's 
four years had been tenuous. In 1932 he severed the loose bond and openly turned 
against Hoover. The possible reasons for this are numerous. He had not experi­
enced any liking for Hoover in the first place and was dissatisfied with the admin­
istration's record in office. Furthermore, in 1932 Franklin D. Roosevelt seemed 
to symbolize much of the old progressive philosophy. The Roosevelt nomination was 
secured by the same sectional combination that had backed Bryan's candidacy in I896j 
and Wilson's in 1912. The new President had carried 282 counties that no Democrat 
had ever carried before, but of these only hZ had not been carried by Teddy Roose­
velt in 1912 or by Robert LaFollette in I92I4. on Progressive tickets.’1'
In the interim between Roosevelt's election and the inauguration, Johnson in­
dicated a number of times his expectations of the new President to whom he had ren­
dered such avid support. In the Senate he expressed hope that
...with the changes which may occur within a brief period,...we will 
have those in control who look upon one thing, and one alone, first—  
the great American people and the United States of America. 2
Johnson's belief was that with Roosevelt, we would have in the White House an 
isolationist— a true patriot who shared the Senator's idea that the U.S. was for 
Americans and Europe was for Europeans5 and never the former should become con­
cerned about the latter. Roosevelt had provided some basis for Johnson's optimism 
In campaigning, the aspiring President insisted that the League had not lived up
1 Brogan, pp. 31-32.
2 Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Session, p. 1271, Jan. U, 1933.
2to its expectations, and he would not lead the U.S. into it. In his two White 
House discussions with Hoover, he had shown that he did not consider the war debts 
•his baby.* Roosevelt's first administration was to revolve chiefly around domes­
tic policies, and this seemed clear before he took office. That foreign policy 
would be subordinate was exhibited at London by the new Presidents refusal to sta­
bilize the dollar. Even his recognition of the U.S.S.R. in 1933 is believed to 
have been the result of his desire to reduce the slack in the American economy.
At the outset, it appeared that here was finally a President with whom John­
son would get along. Grateful for the Senators support in the election, Roosevelt 
offered him a cabinet post and later, a place on the American delegation to the 
-London Economic Conference* Both were refused. This perhaps was because Johnson 
was still too much a Republican to ally himself with the Democratic administration, 
but a more logical reason would be that his pride would not permit subservience at 
this time any more than it would in 1920 when he refused to be Harding's running 
mate. By 1932 Johnson seemed to be venerating his position of independence.
He particularly displayed this in Roosevelt's first administration. In April, 
193U, the Johnson Act passed, prohibiting loans to defaulting nations— the logical 
culmination of his condemnation of the debtor nations who had "sponged" from the 
U.S. His argument against the acceptance of token payments made by Great Britain 
and Italy was similarly successful, for these nations were afterwards informed that 
unless obligations were honored fully, they too would be regarded as defaulters.
The result was that all except Finland repudiated outright in June, 193lu
Johnson also made a good attempt to prevent Hull's reciprocal trade idea from 
gaining approval. In addition to being a somewhat internationalist scheme, the 
agreements were to be a means of lowering the tariff without necessarily repealing 
the existing Hawley-Smoot tariff. Johnson seems to have had a two-fold basis for 
his opposition to Hull and the latter's advocacy of a trend to lower tariffs.
First, it is easy to see how a high tariff would be in accord with the complete
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insulation Johnson sought for the U.S. Second, following his victory over corpor­
ate rule in California, Johnson had gradually become more friendly to the business 
interests there. Much evidence exists which causes one to doubt whether his con­
victions were as progressive as he professed them to be. His alliance with the 
conservative William Randolph Hearst was well known by this time. Some even went 
so far as to say he was Hearst controlled. Progressivism was still, however, the 
banner under which he expressed his views.
The trade agreements act was attacked, because of the powers it gave the Pres­
ident, constituting a destructive interference with the people's rights. His argu­
ment upon the "fundamental principle" involved was made notwithstanding his "admi­
ration, ...respect, and even...affection for the gentleman who occupies the White 
3House." The appeal was to emotion:
It is a frightful thing today, the sin of patriotism in this land, 
and there are societies throughout this country now that believe that 
none of us should ever dare teach our children and our grandchildren to 
love their country, and who preach we should set some fine exairple and 
leave ourselves naked and defenseless to all the world, k
Jealously guarding the powers of the Senate as usual, Johnson offered an
amendment which sought to preserve for the Senate the right to pass by majority
vote upon the treaties to be made by the President under the bill. His plea was
for the preservation of popular government as it existed in the land.'*
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, however, in accord with economic sense,
passed without the amendment^ lowering of tariff rates was already overdue since
the bottom had been reached in the depression. Under the act, the President was
empowered to negotiate with other countries for tariff reductions. To submit the
3 Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Session, p. 9960, May 30, 193k. 
k Ibid., p. 9963* May 30, 193k.
5 Ibid., p. 10371* June k* 193k.
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resulting treaties to a Senate vote, as Johnson suggested, would have removed the 
flexibility for which the program was designed.
In spite of Johnson's attempts to block the trade agreements program, the ad­
ministration supported his reelection in 193l|* The 2,000,000 votes he received 
running on four different tickets^can be cited as evidence that Californians en­
thusiastically approved of his Senatorial record. Perhaps history was briefly on 
jhis side. His isolationist views were more practical now, it seemed, since Europe 
had proved its immorality through default.
These views were successful in the World Court issue of 1935; Johnson dealt 
Roosevelt his first major defeat at home in world affairs.' Again, the Court was 
painted by the Senator as a stepping stone to the League. Once in the Court, he 
said, the TJ.S. would be used by European nations to win their victories. Europe 
was an incessant trouble spot, and he lamented U.S. action in World War I, pointing 
to the disappointing results of the mission. The Senator failed, however, to take 
into account that the U.S. had made no move after 1919 to produce different results^ 
In his intense manner, he spoke out against those who said we should go into 
the Court to preserve the peace:
Where do they go if they want to preserve peace? Not to their 
League or Court. Italy meets with France in secrecy for the deter­
mination of African boundaries and for the settlement of differences 
that may exist. 8
Here one sees shades of Wilson— the disdain for secret diplomacy. Also, 
Johnson seemed to feel that the Court, if it were to exist, must exist to settle 
ail disputes or none at all. He neglected the possibilities of negotiation, media-
6 "Johnson: 'Ye People's' Roaring Senator from California," Newsweek, V 
(Jan. 26, 1935) p. 15.
7 "Johnson: Symbol of Extreme Nationalism," Literary Digest, CXIX (March 23, 
1935) p. 13.
8 Congressional Record, 7lfth Cong., 1st Session, p. 1*80, Jan. 16, 1935*
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tion and conciliation which usually precede arbitration or adjudication on any 
matter.
He went on to point out the malfunctioning of the Court and League, and ac­
cused the Court of rendering political rather than judicial decisions. He was 
angered that the proposed reservation to "protect us from any political action witt
nations abroad" had been defeated when the bill was in committee, but he predicted
othat it would come up again on the floor.
The war debt default by European nations was another point in the argument.
10He saw it as absurd that a creditor submit himself to "the judgment of his debtors."
The words of the founding fathers in regard to entangling alliances were 
pointed to as if they were some sort of divine gospel to continue through the ages. 
He overlooked any indication that conditions had changed somewhat, and these words 
of wisdom no longer held a magical key to peace. Hot only had the power structure 
of the world changed by the 1930's, but the nature of war itself had been trans- j 
formed.
Johnson was opposed to setting a date for a vote on the Court. Tactics of 
delay were important, for with his able allies doing their part outside the Senate 
debate room, public opinion was bound to swing against the Court. To assure this, 
the group employed many techniques of successful advertising. Testimonials were 
used. In the Senate, Johnson presented a document from Herbert Wright, an American 
judge who had also served on the Court, in which the latter said that the nation 
should not adhere to the protocol if it was opposed to entering the League, for 
the Court was an integral part of the League. There was an appeal to patriotism; 
he accused the intellectuals of holding views which would have us change the Gov-
9 Ibid., p. 1*82, Jan. 16, 1935.
10 Ibid., p. 1*81*, Jan. 16, 1935
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ernment Tinder which we had lived so long. A desire to maintain status over minor­
ity groups even entered into the picture. Johnson predicted that the questions of 
Oriental immigration and Oriental tenure of U.S. land might someday be taken to the 
Court
The publicity campaign, in which the voters were called upon by Coughlin to 
write to their Congressmen, proved a success for the isolationists. At the begin­
ning of the debate, Johnson and Borah were known to be against the Court, but the
administration still figured that, with sixty-eight Democratic Senators, it had
13the necessary two-thirds vote. When voting finally took place, though, the yeas 
numbered only fifty-two. A popular sentiment had been well exploited.
The desire to keep out of war became an obsession in the latter half of the 
decade as Europe drew closer and closer to its second cataclysm. At the same time, 
Roosevelt was changing his viewpoint from one of isolationism to one similar to 
Hull’s idea of sanctions and aid to the Allies. This was especially indicated in 
1937 in his ‘quarantine’ speech. Yet, the demand existed for neutrality legisla­
tion to avoid the mistakes by which we had gotten into World War I.
There were three different schools of thought, however, on how to do the avoid? 
Sing. The classical theory of defending our neutral rights was still advocated by 
some, although this had proved a failure in keeping us out of the first World War. 
More popular, however, were the sanction!st and isolationist theories. Johnson, of 
course, was in the isolationist group, but his specific viewpoint incorporated much 
of the classical theory. Sanctions was the method proposed by Hull and Secretary 
of War Stimson; this would be to use means short of war to stop aggression. Sanc­
tions had been the original League idea, but to Johnson, they were inhumane:
11 Ibid., p. I4.88, Jan. 16, 193$.
12 "Up Senate, Down Court,” Time, XXV, Part I (Feb. 11, 193$) p. 13.
13 Ibid.
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I would rather see ray grandsons go out and with guns upon their 
shoulders, take their chance and fight than to be a party to levying 
sanctions upon an innocent people, and upon children, the weak, the 
sick, the lame, the halt— those who never did a wrong. lU
Thus, here was the fervid nationalist, suddenly assuming a humanitarian air about 
the whole world. He preferred another war to such methods as the embargo and boy­
cott, which were "stronger than war." The isolationist idea would not support such 
[partiality as that embodied in Hull's advocacy of trade with friendly nations and 
restriction of trade with aggressor nationsj this seemed too close to an alliance, 
let, Johnson and Borah differed with other isolationists such as Senator Gerald P. 
jNye on the issue of mandatory neutrality legislation, which embodied the idea that 
to be impartial we should restrict trade of war articles with all belligerent na­
tions in the event of war. The California Senator saw impartiality as being more 
effectively maintained by trading with all nations on an equal basis.
It was his feeling that permanent neutrality legislation would likely prove
1<
[inflexible when confronted with unique circumstances. The arms embargo was his 
specific point of contention. For instance, by being neutral in the Italian-Ethio- 
pian war, he said, we helped Italy, for it was Ethiopia which needed to import arms 
Johnson saw that the resolution would not accomplish great results; he realized 
that a nation cannot legislate war out of existence. He called upon Professor 
Edwin M. Borchard of Yale and John B. Moore, former justice of the World Court, to 
tell the Foreign Relations committee that the neutrality legislation was likely to 
lead to war rather than peace^ The United States, he stated, should declare a pol­
icy of neutrality, but, in accordance with that, retain its rights under interna­
tional law. Thus, Johnson was mingling his isolationism with the classical theory
1)| Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Session, p. 2131, March 2, 1939*
15 "Background for War," Time, XXXIV (July 17, 1939) P* 18*
16 "Peace Passion Cold," Time, XXVII (Feb. 21*, 1936) p. 35.
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of avoiding participation in Europe's wars by maintaining neutral rights.
The sanctionists— specifically, Hull— also opposed neutrality legislation, but 
on the grounds that it prevented the United States from aiding those nations whose 
interests coincided closely with ours. Sill's idea was that if we aided England 
and France with supplies, we perhaps could escape actual involvement in another 
European war. Aiding the Allies was definitely not Johnson's idea of pursuing U.S. 
interests. Thus, although his vote on neutrality legislation would correspond to 
administration wishes, his arguments on specific points endangered administration 
policy. Judging from his vague position here, it would seem that Johnson did not 
know what he really wanted. As always, though, he knew exactly what he did not 
want.
For instance, when the cash-and-carry principle for non-war materials was in­
troduced into the neutrality legislation in 1937* Johnson's criticism was vehement, 
Cor by limiting exports on raw materials to only those nations which could pay cash 
and carry the goods for which they then had title in their own vessels, the act was 
to curtail U.S. trade. By this provision, he said, we would "permit other peoples 
to carry on the commerce of the world." Again, the Senator indicated inconsistency 
aetween his economic views and his isolationisms
I am not one of those who believes that in commerce there is some­
thing terrible that inures to and oppresses our people. I was taught 
originally that commerce on the high seas was the lifeblood of a nation 
and that this was the very thing most desired by nations. 17
In pointing out our rights to ocean commerce in international law, he called
attention to Washington's and Jefferson's insistence upon those rights. He also
cited our persistence in putting forth our claims in the Alabama case following the
3ivil War. He attacked his usual isolationist colleagues as being "peace-at-any-
17 Congressional Record, Cong., 1st Session, p. 1778, March 3* 1937
|price people." Johnson's policy for remaining neutral was to follow international 
law, allowing U.S. citizens to trade and travel on ships of belligerents at their 
own risk. The 1937 neutrality resolution was to further restrict trade and prohi­
bit travel by U.S. citizens on ships of belligerents.
The Senator argued that cash-and-carry would cause resentment against us by
19all except those strong enough to obtain our raw materials. Thus, the provision
made us an ally of Great Britain in the Atlantic and Japan in the Pacific, for
20only these two nations had strong enough navies to convoy goods across. This was 
undoubtedly realized by most members of the administration and Congress, but here 
again, how one stood on the matter depended on which group of nations he regarded 
as the greatest threat. It was Hull's intention to aid the Alliesj Japan was to 
be later ruled out of the benefiting group by a specific embargo. It was Johnson'S 
intention to aid neither the Allies, nor Japan.
Again in 1939 , with war in Europe already underway, the administration made a 
vigorous attempt to change neutrality legislation and scuttle the aims embargo, so 
that aims could go by "cash-and-carry." Key Pittman, chairman of the Foreign Re­
lations committee, had even withdrawn his foimer support of the arms embargo. But, 
as the situation in Europe led others to realize the impracticality of neutrality 
legislation in existence, it caused Hiram Johnson to embrace what he had previous­
ly opposed.
Thus, Johnson now argued against repeal of the arms embargo. The reasons he 
gave were embodied in two 'self-evident* truths: first, that such a repeal would 
favor the Allies, and second, that this If accomplished after the beginning of the
18 Ibid., p. 1779, March 3, 1937.
19 Ibid., p. 1778, March 3, 1937.
20 Ibid., p. 1782, March 3, 1937.
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war, would be unneutral. The proposed change, he said, was not a return to inter­
national law, but a “defiance1' of international law, since the aims traffic had
21been prohibited when the war broke out. The position of Pittman and the administra 
tion, on the other hand, was that the embargo was unneutral, because it helped 
Japan, which could still get the materials, and Germany, which could obtain goods 
by way of Russia and Italy— still neutral in 1939 • Which policy was more neutral 
seemed to be merely a matter of opinion as to which side constituted the greatest 
threat. For the administration, this was Hitler, who might destroy the European 
balance of power. For Johnson, the threat was from the Allies, who might involve 
us again in their war.
Johnson was firmly convinced that Hitler constituted no threat to the United 
States. He thought it perfectly idiotic to assume that the Fuehrer would ever 
conquer Europe. History would not support such an assumption. Even the great Na­
poleon had been unable to do so. It was even more absurd, he thought, to believe 
that were Hitler to succeed in his conquest of Europe, he could successfully attack 
the U.S., for in Europe he would suffer from revolts and "a resurgent nationalism."1 
And if we had not spent our resources in a European war that was not ours, "we 
could stand on our own shores, with our airplanes and carriers, and a vastly super­
ior navy, and laugh at his efforts." As Johnson saw it, there was no such thing as 
22
"our being next." He entreated the Senators not to repeat the mistake they had 
made in 1917. His speechmaking in the Senate at this point was an attempt to re­
kindle the disgust with World War I and the Versailles peace that had existed in 
1920. Galling attention to the failure of Wilson's crusade, he revealed bitter
21 Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 2nd Session, p. 630, Oct. 20, 1939*
22 Ibid., p. 630, Oct. 20, 1939.
his amendment proposing to remove the President's discretionary power to decide 
(whether a foreign conflict endangered the nation's security or peace. It led also 
to his amendment to prevent Congress' declaring neutrality laws in effect. It led 
to his support of an amendment, proposed by Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin, to set 
up an export control board. It led to his approval of an amendment to make it un­
lawful to export arms and ammunition except to American nations engaged in defen­
sive war against a non-American nation. It led to his affirmation of an amendment 
bo restrict use of American ports by war vessels of belligerent nations. It led to 
his agreement with the LaFollette Resolution providing for a national referendum 
prior to declaration of war, except in case of attack. It led to his 'aye* vote on 
an amendment providing that prior to export of articles on materials they be paid 
for in full in U.S. moneyj Johnson had likewise charged that "cash-and-carry" had 
come to be "credit-and-carry." Each of these amendments, designed to prevent a 
change in what Johnson considered to be an effective neutrality policy, received 
the Senator's vote. Yet, each was rejected. So also was the amendment proposed by
Senator Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri to restore the arms embargo to the pending
26neutrality resolution.
The Neutrality Act of 1939, repealing the arms embargo, passed 63-30, without 
Johnson's vote. It seems that the Senator's isolationist thunder had lost its 
inpact.





To what extent did Johnson influence or weaken the foreign policies of Hoover 
and Roosevelt? He was an isolationist, a member of that group in Congress which 
the Presidents of the 1930‘s were forced by politics to appease, while at the same 
time trying to cope with a world in turmoil. But, one may argue, he was not the 
only isolationist in this period. In the Senate alone there were: ’William Borah, 
Republican from Idaho; Burton Wheeler, Democrat from Montana; Arthur Vanderiburg, 
Republican from Michigan; Bennett Champ dark, Democrat from Missouri; Gerald P. 
Nye, Republican from North Dakota; William Bulow, Democrat from South Dakota; 
Robert LaFollette, Progressive from Wisconsin; Arthur Capper, Republican from Kan­
sas; David Walsh, Democrat from Massachusetts; George Aiken, Republican from Ver­
mont; Hugh Butler, Republican from Nebraska; C. Wayland Brooks, Republican from 
Illinois; D. Worth Clark, Democrat from Idaho; John Danaher, Republican from Con­
necticut; James Davis, Republican from Pennsylvania; Rufus Holman, Republican from 
Oregon; Edwin Johnson, Democrat from Colorado; William Langer, Republican from 
North Dakota; Pat McCarran, Democrat from Nevada; Robert Reynolds, Democrat from 
North Carolina; Henrik Shipstead, Republican from Minnesota; Robert Taft, Republi­
can from Ohio; John Thomas, Republican from Idaho; Charles Tobey, Republican from 
New Hampshire; Alexander Wiley, Republican from Wisconsin; and Raymond Willis, Re­
publican from Indiana.'1'
Indeed, isolationism was not limited by party lines in the decade; the nation 
was isolationist. Yet, because the sentiment existed as a part of the traditional 
American way of avoiding war, it did not necessarily have to produce a militantly 
stubborn neutrality. For this, much blame goes to Hiram Johnson and the national
1 Kenneth Colegrove, The American Senate and World Peace (New York: The
Vanguard Press, 19U-0 p. 2oT.
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leaders like him, who would base policies on a distorted sense of *right,' rather 
than a careful study of the demands of world politics. He exploited what isola­
tionist sentiment did exist. He exploited emotions of fear. He exploited the very 
democratic form of government to which he professed his intense loyalty, for he 
made legislative battles a matter of courting the people, rather than bringing the 
facts to them. So in the 1930*3, leadership, in many instances, was sacrificed for 
popularity with the uninformed mass of voters.
Johnson never seemed able to find a President who advocated policies with 
which he was able to agree— unless we take into account past Presidents, Washing­
ton, Jefferson, and Monroe. It did not matter too much whether the President in 
power was of Johnson*s party or of the opposition party; the Senator was sceptical 
of rendering support to any Executive. Perhaps, one can attribute this, in part, 
to a jealousy of those who held the office. During Johnson's service in the Sen­
ate, many journals and publications maintained that he was dominated by a desire to 
be President. He, obviously, was one who sought distinction. To discredit admin­
istration policies would be to credit his own, which held out the opposite alterna-f 
tive on matters. For the nation to accept Johnson's policies would, logically, be 
to accept the idea that Johnson would make a better President than the man in 
office. Hence, if the nation demanded isolationism, the GOP would be likely to 
give them Johnson as a Presidential candidate.
When Hoover was assured the candidacy in 1928, Johnson seemed to give up the 
hope that the Republican party would ever hand him the nomination. But his extreme 
isolationist role, an individualistic position, and his success in winning legisla­
tive battles against the administrations had given him a considerable amount of 
distinction as a Senator. Thus, it was this distinction he sought to maintain in 
the 1930 *s— not to be known as the Republican Senator from California, but as Sen­
ator Johnson. He would succumb to no person and no party. As he was concerned 
with national dignity and Senatorial dignity, he was intent on maintaining perso
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dignity. As he perceived so many threats to the two former, it would seem he in­
terpreted any defeat as a threat to the last. Johnson was known in political cir­
cles as a pessimist. What turned out to he overwhelming election victories had 
been pre-calculated by the Senator as defeats. He seemed to carry this pessimism 
over into legislative battles, fighting for an issue in a manner one would fight 
for his honor. Thus, the distinguished Senator from California was just that—  
distinguished by the views he held, methods he used, and results he achieved. He 
had built a personal success story on negativism.
Domestically, his Senatorial preaching was a lesson in what not to do. The 
nation should not go into the League; it should not join the World Court; it should 
not sign the Four Power Pact because of the collective security clause; it should 
not revise or cancel war debts; it should not loan to defaulting nations; it should 
not agree to the London treaty; it should not grant tariff reductions in any way; 
it should not render ary aid to the Allied nations or any nation at war. It should 
not do anything that would require a step beyond its own shores. Johnson never 
conceived of carrying the love of which he constantly spoke past the continental 
limits of the United States. It was not until after World War II— which he be­
lieved his philosophy would keep us from— that Americans were to abandon Johnson »s 
idea and come closer to identifying their own interests with those of mankind in 
the broadest sense.
Internationally, his oft-repeated lecture was a lesson to foreign nations in 
what not to expect. They should not expect U.S. participation in any collective 
security agreement or effort to guarantee world peace; they should not expect any 
consideration of revision or cancellation of war debts; they should not expect to 
export much to the U.S.; they should not expect any more loans if they defaulted 
on war debts; they should not expect U.S. aid in any event, peace or war. The 
lessons were well learned; yet, the problems were not solved, for the content of 
the course was grossly inadequate.
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Johnson not only led or played a major part in the defeat of numerous measures 
concerning foreign policy, but his influence in Congress and in the nation's press 
in the 1930's caused Roosevelt to proceed more slowly and more cautiously in meet­
ing the rising international crisis. When the President spoke at Chicago in Octo­
ber, 19375 urging a 'quarantine* on aggressor nations, Johnson was one of those who 
demanded a retreat from that stand. In the Senate, he was provoked to ask for a 
definition of U.S. foreign policy, condemning Roosevelt's use of the word 'quaran­
tine.' He offered a resolution demanding that the Secretary of State inform the
Senate as to whether any secret agreement existed between the U.S. and other na- 
2tions. He knew the position in which this put the President and cabinet members 
who sought more positive moves in thwarting the actions of the European dictators, 
yet did not want to commit political suicide. So long as there were men like John­
son around to sell the people on the idea that there was an easy way out of unde­
sirable situations, and so long as there was a lack of leaders willing to undertake 
the task of educating the people on the difficult remedy, isolationism would pre­
vail— at least until war shocked the nation into a change. This it did.
As Europe went to war, there were Americans who said we must give aid to the 
Allies or fight ourselves. It was our war as well as theirs; America's increased 
power and the transportation revolution of the twentieth century forced us to be 
concerned with the European balance of power# There were people who heard these 
men, and many became less isolationist. Yet, internationalist and sanctionist 
views seemed to rebound from Johnson's ears, and there were others like him. They 
remained isolationist. But the former catagory began to outnumber the latter. 
Still, Johnson insisted that the U.S. was not going to become involved in another 
war, and the statement was to furnish its own proof. He took a stand against Con­
gress and public opinion on defense legislation. But the Senator's cause was a
2 Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3rd Session, p. 1532, Feb. 7, 1938
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dying one. By I9I4I we scraped all remnants of neutrality legislation and were 
actively involved in war. The isolationism of the 1920's and 1930's had failed; 
internationalism was worth a try.
The new point of view was embraced by practically all, including the former 
isolationists in Congress who in World War II finally had shifted gears. This was 
not true of Johnson. He was expected to take a stand against acceptance of the 
United Nations charter in 19k5» When the vote on the international organization 
was taken, however, only Langer and Shipstead cast 'nays.' Senator Johnson lay 
dying in the hospital.
Hence, if one may daxe to use symbolism in a dissertation such as this, John­
son's death can be cited as just that— a symbol of the death of isolationism. But 
just as persons frequently live on in the minds of men, a philosophy, even when 
proved unsuccessful in practice, may leave its traces. There are vestiges of John­
son's '.Americanism' to be found today. It is subtle, and in most cases, sublimated, 
but it is there. In some it means a desire for insulation or the quest for abso­
lute security. These persons cannot accept the fact that the U.S.S.R. controls 
Eastern Europe or that Communist China is there to stay; to realize this would be 
to admit there is no such thing as security in the world and that this nation must 
of necessity be involved in the never-ending game of power politics where the illu­
sion of security is no more than a momentary advantage in relative strength. These 
persons would ban all foreign aid and invest the money in more retaliatory weapons, 
for so long as the U.S. can strike back effectively we need fear no one, and allies 
they reason, are only that so long as they can 'sponge' on the U.S. treasury.
In others, Johnson's 'Americanism' exists merely as a type of moral self- 
righteousness. The United States, they say, would never drop an atomic bomb or be 
the first to use a missile, but the other side would not hesitate to do so. They 
neglect Hiroshima and Nagaski; they overlook the propaganda disadvantage this World 
War II action gave us. They are quick to condemn the actions of other states and
slow to admit our own mistakes in the realm of international relations. The United 
States can do no wrong in their eyes, and hence, must, of right, triumph in any 
cause. This leads to a complacency about the world situation, a disinterestedness 
in international events. These are the "JohnsonitesM5 their isolationism is la­
tent, but, nonetheless, existent. It is difficult to discard entirely an idea 
which was oversold to the American people in the not-yet-distant past. And the 
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